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Augustine on Creation, Providence and Motion 
 
Simon Oliver 
Durham  University 
 
Augustine’s theology of creation has been criticised for its Platonic tendency to 
denigrate matter and a supposedly extrinsic view of divine providence that is 
reminiscent of design and even deism. This article counters such criticism and argues 
that Augustine explicitly blends extrinsic and intrinsic notions of providential 
teleological order. For Augustine, God ‘administers externally the natures he has 
created internally’ by inscribing the rationes seminales within creatures and 
conferring motion through the mediation of measure, number and weight. By resisting 
a dualism of intrinsic and extrinsic teleological order, Augustine avoids many of the 
problems that characterise modern theologies of creation and provides a more 
coherent account of divine providence. 
 
 
The Christian doctrine of creation has a number of aspects: the identity of the creator, 
the divine act of creation ex nihilo, the natures and ends of created things and God’s 
providential governance of creation. Within this scheme, there are two foundational 
and related questions: how are we to distinguish between God and creation, and how 
is creation related to its creator? The two dominant views of creation available to 
early Christian theologians from the Greek philosophical tradition presented problems 
on both counts. Emanationism, articulated most clearly by Plotinus in the third 
century, suggests that creation flows from God by necessity much as light emerges 
from a candle.
1
 Creation is simply a ‘stretching’ of divine being so that God and 
                                                          
1
 Plotinus, Ennead V, trans. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), V.1.6. Nevertheless, it might be noted that Aquinas entitles 
his principal question on creation in the Summa Theologiae ‘de modo emanationis 
rerum a primo principio’. Of course, for Aquinas the ‘emanation’ of all things from 
the first principle is a wholly free act of God who creates ex nihilo. In common with 
the Neoplatonists, Aquinas does not regard creation as any kind of motion (that is, 
one thing becoming another). 
creation are somehow coterminous. As the emanation of all things is conceived in 
Neoplatonism, the freedom of God’s creative act is compromised and the distinction 
between God and creation is difficult to identify. The Greek tradition also offered a 
view of creation either as existing in endless time or as the ordering of chaotic matter 
that had always existed. In both cases, a material nature stands alongside God and 
does not find its ultimate origin in the divine. Once again, it seems difficult to 
distinguish God and creation because there appear to be two principles of creation: 
God’s action plus an always-existent material upon which God acts. Both emanation 
and construction seem problematic in relation to the doctrine of God, so Jewish and 
Christian theologians articulated a radical alternative in the form of creation ex 
nihilo.
2
 The simplicity and freedom of God mean that God cannot be constrained in 
his creative act by pre-existent matter and must be the unique source and focus of 
being. Creation ex nihilo has a double implication: God is the absolute source of 
everything that is not God (including time and space) and creation is, in itself, 
nothing. The act of creation is the wholly gratuitous and unnecessary donation of 
being by God. At every moment, creation is sustained in existence by God’s eternal 
gratuity. In God’s creative act there is not one thing (God) and suddenly two things 
(God plus creation). There is only one focus of being and all else exists by 
participation in that single source. The difference between God and creation is 
articulated in terms of God’s unchanging eternal simplicity and creaturely 
composition and motion.  
 
Augustine, writing in 390AD around four years after his conversion to Christianity, 
gives a succinct version of this patristic view of creation through a brief dialogue. The 
doctrines of creation ex nihilo and divine immutability are central to his 
understanding. 
 
But you say to me: “Why are they failing?” Because they are subject to 
change. “Why are they subject to change?” Because they do not have being in 
                                                          
2
 For a recent and wide-ranging discussion of creation ex nihilo, see David Burrell, 
Carlo Cogliati, Janet Soskice and William Stoeger (eds.), Creation and the God of 
Abraham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
the supreme degree. “Why not?” Because they are inferior to the one by whom 
they were made. “Who is it that made them?’ The one who is in the supreme 
degree. “Who is that?” God, the unchanging Trinity, since he both made them 
through his supreme Wisdom and preserves them through his supreme 
Kindness. “Why did he make them?” So that they might be. Just being, after 
all, in whatever degree, is good, because the supreme Good is being in the 
supreme degree. “What did he make them out of?” From nothing, since 
whatever is must have some kind of specific look, however minimal.
3
 
 
Although Augustine’s view of creation appears wholly consonant with wider 
Christian teaching, it has recently been subject to criticism arising from a suspicion of 
his Platonism.
4
 It is alleged that, under the influence of his reading of Cicero’s 
translation of Plato’s Timaeus as well as other Platonist writings, Augustine held a 
dualistic view of the relation between the spiritual and material. According to Colin 
Gunton, he denigrated the material realm and proposed that matter is manipulated by 
a divine designer according to the pattern of eternal forms. In particular, this neglects 
the centrality of Christ, the one through whom all things are created (John 1.3; 
Colossians 1.16), in a properly Christian doctrine of creation.
5
 Augustine, still 
                                                          
3
 Augustine, De vere religione (‘True Religion’), paragraph 35 available in Edmund 
Hill, O.P. et al, trans., On Christian Belief (New York: New City Press, 2005). 
4
 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 
5
 Colin E. Gunton, ‘Creation’ in Gunton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 149-150. See 
Augustine, De civitate dei, VIII.12 in R.W. Dyson, trans., The City of God against the 
Pagans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 328-329: ‘But above 
all…there is the fact that, when the words of God were brought to the holy Moses by 
an angel, and Moses asked the name of Him Who charged him to go and deliver the 
Hebrew people out of Egypt, the answer was: ‘I am who am; and thou shalt say to the 
children of Israel, He Who is sent me unto you.’ This is as if to say that, in 
comparison with Him Who truly is, because He is immutable, things which are 
created mutable have no being. This is a view which Plato vehemently held and most 
diligently commended; and, as far as I know, this statement is found nowhere in the 
haunted by his Manichean past, purportedly denies value to the world’s material 
processes and proposes a cosmic hierarchy that prioritises spiritual natures.
6
 Despite 
numerous treatises in which Augustine points to the centrality of creation ex nihilo,
7
 
Gunton detects an ambivalence about this core Christian teaching because material 
creation, far from being ‘very good’ according to the testimony of Genesis, is 
described by Augustine as ‘close to being nothing’.8  Gunton wonders whether a 
Greek doctrine of the eternity of formless matter still lurks in the back of Augustine’s 
mind. Allied to this concern about a denigration of the material is another common 
criticism of the patristic doctrine of creation as it came under the spell of Platonism: 
Augustine’s thought features a strong distinction – or even dualism – between divine 
eternity and worldly time that apparently precludes any intelligible notion of divine 
action.
9
 Another related criticism concerns an alleged two-stage understanding of 
creation in Augustine’s theology. First, God creates the intellectual world of ideas 
and, secondly, the material world which imitates the forms. According to Gunton, this 
has ‘had the effect of tying the doctrine of creation to a belief that species were 
created as timeless and unchanging forms, a belief that made theories of evolution 
more difficult to engage positively during the nineteenth century.’10 
 
Broadly speaking, Gunton’s criticisms place Augustine within a tradition of thought 
that regards the universe as designed in a fashion that is closely analogous to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
books of those who came before Plato, other than where it is said, ‘I am who am; and 
thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He Who is sent me unto you.’’ 
6
 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p. 77. 
7
 Amongst many examples, see Augustine, De fide et symbolo (‘Faith and the Creed’), 
2(2) in Michael G. Campbell, O.S.A. et al., trans., On Christian Belief (Hyde Park, 
New York: New City Press, 2005); De Genesi contra Manichaeos (‘On Genesis: A 
Refutation of the Manichees’), I.3(5) in Edmund Hill, O.P., trans., On Genesis (Hyde 
Park, New York: New City Press, 2002); Confessiones (‘Confessions’), XII.7, XII.17, 
XIII.33 in F.J. Sheed, trans., Confessions (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006). 
8
 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p.78-79. Augustine, Confessiones, XII.8. 
9
 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p. 83. 
10
 Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture 
of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 2. 
human manufacture of artefacts.
11
 On this view, God imposes form upon passive 
matter much as the human designer of an artefact imposes her design upon the 
material at her disposal. This reverses the Aristotelian teaching that art imitates 
nature; now human artifice is the model according to which we understand the divine 
act of creation. This way of understanding divine creativity is often thought to have a 
precedent in Plato’s Timaeus because of the divine craftsman’s fashioning of 
disorderly matter by the application of the ‘eternal model’. So the Platonist Augustine 
is easily slotted into this story of a divine designer standing over and against a 
recalcitrant or formless materiality that has no intrinsic value.
12
 The teleological 
structure of creation becomes external, being imposed from without upon passive 
matter according the priorities of the authoritarian divine will. Material nature is not 
intrinsically ordered to particular ends and therefore has no intrinsic value, but has 
that order imposed upon it according to forms contained within the divine mind.
13
 
 
To explain further, one is faced with two apparently different views of teleological 
and providential order. They can be described via Aristotle’s distinction between the 
natural, which has within itself a principle of motion and rest, and the artificial, which 
                                                          
11
 At first glance, there appears to be textual evidence for this interpretation. See, for 
example, St. Augustine, In Evangelium Iohannis Tractatus, I.9 available in John 
Rettig, trans., Tractates on the Gospel of John 1-10 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University Press of America, 1988): ‘For the heart first begets a design in order for 
you to construct some building, to erect some massive structure upon the land…So, if 
human design is praised because of some great building, do you wish to see what a 
design of God is the Lord Jesus Christ, that is, the Word of God?’  
12
 The interpretation of Plato’s cosmology, in particular the meaning of the ‘divine 
craftsman’, is much contested. See Plato, Timaeus, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). For recent discussions see David 
Sedley, Creationism and its Critics (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2007), ch. 4; Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), ch.1. 
13
 For a detailed discussion of the dualism between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology, 
see Simon Oliver ‘Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology’, Nova et Vetera 11(3), 2013, 
pp. 849-870. 
does not have within itself a principle of motion and rest.
14
 Take the example of a 
photocopier. The goal of the machine is the production of copies of a given document. 
That teleological order is not, however, intrinsic to the materials from which the 
photocopier is built. Such order comes from the intentionality of the photocopier’s 
designer and operator. The material nature of the photocopier – the metal, electronics 
and toner – has an order and orientation imposed upon it by the designer and operator. 
Such order and orientation does not emerge from the form of the photocopier’s 
material parts but has its origin in human design and manufacture, that is, in the forms 
present in the designer’s mind. The material stuff from which the machine is made is 
passive or even resistant to the form and order imposed upon it by the process of 
design and manufacture. Once the photocopier is manufactured and in operation, the 
designer and operator can withdraw and hope for no paper jams. This is a crude 
analogue to the deistic view of God’s creative activity: God orders recalcitrant matter 
according to a model in the divine intentional mind and then withdraws as the cosmic 
machine operates according to a determined pattern. Matter, because it is not 
intrinsically allied to form on this view, is of doubtful value and this is Gunton’s key 
concern. In contrast to the artificial, the teleological order of the natural – an acorn, 
for example – is intrinsic to the creature by virtue of its formal nature. The acorn 
hides within itself the form of oak tree in its potential guise. That potential is 
actualised through the normal operations of nature as the tree grows from the seed. 
Unlike a photocopier, an acorn will unfold its nature into an oak tree, a lamb into a 
sheep and a girl into a woman. These natural things move themselves, hence they 
have within themselves a principle of motion and rest. The material nature is always 
blended with a form that is intrinsic to that nature. Matter therefore has a value 
associated with its proper form and final goal; the teleological order is intrinsic and 
part of a creature’s nature. Note, however, that a similar difficulty remains concerning 
God’s relation to the created order: once forms are inscribed in creatures through a 
blending with materiality, and the direction in which their natures will unfold is 
established, can God simply withdraw? The possibility of a naturalised teleology, 
such as one finds in Plotinus or the Stoics, remains. 
 
                                                          
14
 Aristotle, Physics, trans. P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), II.1-2. 
So an understanding the universe as a work of divine artifice akin to the products of 
human manufacture is part of the deistic theology that became so prominent in early 
modernity; God can stand back from his cosmic machine, repairing it periodically but 
otherwise not intervening in its smooth, predictable and autonomous workings. 
Indeed, this could be seen as the doctrine of creation that rendered God superfluous 
and ceded cosmology and the understanding of nature to an autonomous natural 
science. At his most intemperate, Gunton places Augustine at the root of this 
theological tradition, regarding him as a proto-deist with a disastrous legacy.
15
 
Similarly, one may opt for a purely naturalised teleology in which creaturely 
orientation to particular ends is intrinsic, requiring nothing supernatural. 
 
One may dismiss Gunton’s criticism of Augustine’s view of creation and his 
accusation of deism as eccentric marginalia.
16
 Yet it is part of a wider critique of any 
theology of creation that seeks to blend pagan Greek learning, particularly Platonism, 
with Christian scripture and creation ex nihilo. It is alleged that creation ex nihilo, 
grounded in the scriptural witness to God as sovereignly free and the source of all 
things, was formulated precisely as a critical response to Gnosticism and Platonism; a 
Christian theology of creation should not appropriate pagan learning in so uncritical a 
                                                          
15
 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p.83: ‘However, we should accept only that part of his 
[Augustine’s] argument that would distinguish divine eternity from worldly time. In 
other respects, Augustine’s legacy has been more problematic, if not actually 
disastrous, and provides the conditions for the development of a deism like 
Hawking’s. It is when we pursue the question of the relation of God’s eternity to 
worldly time that we again stumble on the contamination of Augustine’s thought by 
his platonic inheritance. Because for Augustine God is by definition timeless, it 
becomes difficult to conceive of any involvement of God in time.’ 
16
 For an assessment of Gunton’s reading of Augustine on creation, see William B. 
Whitney, Problem and Promise in Colin Gunton’s Doctrine of Creation (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), ch. 1. See also Bradley Green, Colin Gunton and the Failure of 
Augustine: The Theology of Colin Gunton in Light of Augustine (Eugene, OR: 
Pickwick Publications, 2011); Scott A. Dunham, The Trinity and Creation in 
Augustine: An Ecological Analysis (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2008). 
fashion, particularly a variety that denigrates the material. In addition, Augustine’s 
thought can also be included amongst the classical articulations of the doctrine of 
creation that have been criticised for their dualist metaphysics. God apparently stands 
as the active source of all being over and against a passive creation that has no 
integrity and intrinsic value.
17
 This allegedly undergirds a host of pernicious dualisms 
that have plagued Christian theology, amongst them subject and object, nature and 
culture, mind and matter, male and female.
18
 
 
Within this picture, where does Augustine fit? In this article I will argue that 
Augustine’s theology of creation, far from offering a proto-deism or denigration of 
materiality and temporality via the imposition of an extrinsic teleology, does precisely 
the opposite. His view shows how some of the problematic elements of modern 
theologies of creation might be avoided. Following carefully the narrative of Genesis, 
Augustine has a two-fold understanding of creation in which matter is understood 
principally as receptive of form. This is not, however, a passive receptivity and there 
is no interval between the creation of matter and the reception of form. The six days 
of creation establish the rationes seminales (‘rational principles’ or ‘seminal reasons’) 
in the material order that have their origin in the eternal Word. Potentialities are 
established and then realized through providentially guided motion as creation 
participates in God through number, measure and weight. The providential and 
teleological order of creation is not extrinsic because matter is not passive and neutral 
with respect to form. But crucially neither is the providential teleological order of 
creation exclusively intrinsic. Creation has within itself the rational principles of its 
own perfection and is drawn towards its goal by God’s continual providential care and 
                                                          
17
 For a range of critical approaches to creation ex nihilo along these lines, see 
Thomas Jay Oord, ed., Theologies of Creation: Creatio Ex Nihilo and its New Rivals, 
(London: Routledge, 2015). For an alternative to creation ex nihilo that is ambivalent 
about Augustine’s doctrine of creation, see Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A 
Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003).  
18
 Rowan Williams confronts critics of the traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo in 
‘‘Good for Nothing’? Augustine on Creation’, Augustinian Studies 25 (1994), pp. 9-
24, reprinted in Rowan Williams, On Augustine (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), ch.4. 
See also Scott A. Dunham, The Trinity and Creation in Augustine, ch.1. 
guidance. God is both within and beyond the creature in such a way that we find the 
blending of intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of divine providence and creation’s 
orientation to specific ends. Whilst in no sense being like creation, God is both 
immanent to creation and wholly transcendent. For Augustine, retaining that balance 
is crucial to a coherent understanding of creation. It avoids those pernicious dualisms 
to which modern doctrines of creation are allegedly prone. 
 
In the Beginning: Matter and Form 
For Augustine, scripture teaches that the doctrine of creation begins not with general 
observations about nature, but with God. Indeed, the opening verses of Genesis point 
to the mystery of the Trinity: the Father is indicated by the word ‘God’ and the Son is 
indicated by ‘beginning’, for the eternally begotten Word spoken by the Father is the 
principle (archē) of all things. The Spirit, the abundant and generous divine love, 
broods over the waters.
19
 In discussing the very beginning or principle of creation and 
the unformed basic material that is ordered by God, the focus is on the Word through 
whom all things are made.
20
 Augustine makes a distinction between the Word as 
archē and the Word as God’s utterance. As archē, the Word is the principle of 
creation as it comes into being in an imperfect state. As God’s utterance, the Word 
bestows perfection on creation.
21
 Creation is brought into being through the Word as 
principle and that same Word immediately calls it back to perfection. There is no 
interval between the archē and the call to turn to the creator. The Word calls 
primordial creation ‘so that it may be given form by adhering to the creator, and by 
imitating in its own measure the form which adheres eternally and unchangingly to 
the Father, and which instantly gets from him to be the same thing that he is.’22 It is 
through participation in the Word that creatures receive their own form and become 
perfect and complete. In a similar vein, in De vera religione Augustine claims that 
God is ‘uncreated form’ (forma infabricata) who gives beauty to creation by being the 
                                                          
19
 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram (‘The Literal Meaning of Genesis’), I.6.12 and 
I.18.36 in Edmund Hill, O.P., trans., On Genesis (New York: New City Press, 2002). 
20
 Augustine, In Evangelium Iohannis Tractatus [Tractates on the Gospel of John], I. 
21
 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, I.4.9. 
22
 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, I.4.9. 
source of harmony and the beauty of all beauty (omnium speciosissimus), for the 
beauty of all things comes from God (omnis enim species ab illo est).
23
 
 
Augustine also refers to this ‘formless and quality-less matter’ at the beginning of 
creation using the ancient Greek term hyle.
24
 In the beginning, God called back to 
himself this dark and formless void; God called creation to light. This creation and 
return to God under the call of the Word is an imitation of the Son’s eternal return to 
the Father.
25
 As Michael Hanby points out, hyle is ‘interposed in the interval between 
the Father’s intention of and delight in the Son and the Son’s response to and vision 
of the Father.’ 26  In being placed within this eternal begetting and return, hyle 
participates in the conversion to form as it is brought to existence from nothing and 
called to receive its form in the Word of God. However, as Hanby and a number of 
commentators point out, Augustine’s reflections on hyle also indicate that it is not 
passive and indifferent.
27
 Although barely intelligible, it is ‘a capacity for forms’ 
which renders hyle both beautiful and good.
28
 Just as wisdom and the capacity for 
wisdom are goods, so form and the capacity for form are goods. Moreover, because 
every good comes from God, hyle comes only from God. Therefore, far from being 
                                                          
23
 Augustine, De vera religione , paragraph 21. Augustine is using forma and species 
almost synonymously to indicate the ‘look’ or ‘beauty’ of things. This particular 
passage is concerned with the beauty of the body. Here, I am indebted to Carol 
Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of St. Augustine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p.100, n. 22. 
24
 Augustine, De natura boni (‘The Nature of the Good’), 18, available in Boniface 
Ramsey, ed., The Manichean Debate (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2006). 
25
 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, I.4.9: ‘By so turning back and being formed 
creation imitates, every element in its own way, God the Word, that is the Son of God 
who always adheres to the Father in complete likeness and equality of being, by 
which he and the Father are one; but it does not imitate this form of the Word if it 
turns away from the creator and remains formless and imperfect, incomplete.’ 
26
 Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 86. 
27
 Hanby, Augustine and Modernity, pp. 85-88; Scott A. Dunham, The Trinity and 
Creation in Augustine, pp. 99-104; Rowan Williams, ‘Good for Nothing’, p. 17. 
28
 Augustine, De natura boni, 18. 
evil hyle is not even indifferent to the good because it is always seeking form. Insofar 
as hyle shares in intelligibility and being at all, one might say that it is brought to 
existence as that which intrinsically possesses the form of seeking form.
29
 This means 
that the potentiality of hyle is never a pure or bare potentiality because it is measured 
by the prior and eternal actuality of the Word to which it is converted. In other words, 
for Augustine creation has existence only through its intrinsic orientation to the Good, 
this being a participation in the eternal orientation of the Father to the Son and the 
Son to the Father, an orientation of love that is the Holy Spirit. As Dunham points out, 
Augustine emphasises this pneumatological source of creation’s goodness in The City 
of God: ‘God made what He made not from any necessity…but simply from His own 
goodness: that is, so that it might be good…And if this goodness is rightly understood 
to be the Holy Spirit, then the whole Trinity is revealed to us in the works of God.’30 
 
So for Augustine, matter or hyle is not a pure and empty possibility for such a thing 
could not exist. Neither is it a substrate to which is added or imposed a form that 
might be regarded as alien to matter. In fact, Augustine avoids the dualism of 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ when it comes to form’s relation to matter in creation. Form 
is not purely intrinsic to material nature in such a way that created natures become 
self-sufficient and autonomous after the moment of creation. Neither is form purely 
extrinsic in such a way that the order of creation is imposed upon indifferent or 
recalcitrant matter after the fashion of a human designer of an artefact. Matter 
intrinsically seeks form through its origin and participation in the Word who is both 
within and beyond creation. The primordial creation is first and foremost receptive, 
indicating the fundamentally asymmetrical relation of creatures to the creator: God is 
the source of being and creatures receive existence at every moment. So Augustine 
writes, ‘But then all was close to nothingness, for it was still utterly formless; yet is 
was not nothing, for it could receive form.’31 
                                                          
29
 For an argument along these lines with respect to Aristotle’s notion of matter, see 
Simon Oliver, ‘Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology’. 
30
 Augustine, De civitate dei, XI.24 cited in Dunham, The Trinity and Creation in 
Augustine, p.102.  
31
 Augustine, Confessiones, XII.8: ‘illud autem totum prope nihil erat, quoniam adhuc 
omnino informe erat; iam tamen erat, quod formari poterat.’ See also De vere 
 In De Trinitate and his literal commentary on Genesis, Augustine describes the 
formation of matter in a slightly different way. God’s providential establishment of 
creation is via the rationes seminales, a concept of Stoic origin that was deployed by 
the Neoplatonists.
32
 These are ‘causal reasons’ or ‘primal formulae’ that are brought 
to actuality through the motion of time. Within creatures, God provides certain seeds 
of reason that set limits to their development. Put another way, the rationes seminales 
establish the general direction of a creature’s motion towards a particular goal or 
purpose; by means of its rationes seminales, an acorn is set in motion towards the oak 
tree, the chick towards flight, the child towards learning and knowledge, and so on. 
Because these seeds are a creature’s principle and contain in potential form its telos, 
they are also the basis of creation’s intelligible motion in time because they establish 
a beginning and end. The potentialities within creatures are always defined by their 
orientation towards an actuality that is eternally established in the Word. So the 
rationes seminales are, in an important sense, the basis of creation’s history because 
they establish the direction of creaturely activity and development.
33
 However, is this 
somehow deterministic? Are creatures established on a particular path of development 
                                                                                                                                                                      
religione, 18: ‘For the good is that which has been formed; even the potentiality, 
therefore, of being formed is a good of some sort, and that is why the author of all 
good things, who has bestowed form on them, has himself also made the potentiality 
of being formed.’ 
32
 Augustine, De Trinitate, III.2.13: ‘Thus it is the creator of all these invisible seeds 
who is the creator of all things, since whatever comes into our ken by a process of 
birth received the beginnings of its course from hidden seeds, and derives its due 
growth and final distinction of shape and parts from the as it were original rules.’ 
(translation adapted). Translation from Edmund Hill, O.P., trans., The Trinity (New 
York: New City Press, 1991). See also De Genesi ad litteram, VI.14.25. 
33
 Augustine makes the same point with respect to form in Confessiones XII.11: 
‘Now, unless a man is all wandering and whirled about with empty fantasies in the 
emptiness of his heart, would he dare assert that if every form were taken away and 
made utterly naught…this sheer formlessness could show any changes of time? 
Obviously it could not, for where there is no change of movement (motionum) there is 
not time: and there is no change (varietas) where there is no form.’ 
via their intrinsic rationes seminales? At first glance, this could also issue in a 
naturalistic or deistic interpretation of creaturely development (reminiscent of design) 
whereby God simply establishes the internal principles and goals of creatures via the 
rationes seminales before standing aside to allow creation to realise itself. This is not 
how Augustine understands God’s act of creation. Rather, through his reading of the 
seventh day of creation and the divine rest, we will see that God sustains his creation 
at every moment and providentially guides it towards its proper end. 
 
Motion and Providence 
In his literal commentary on Genesis, Augustine asks how it can be that God can 
‘rest’ on the seventh day. Surely creation cannot be a labour which challenges divine 
omnipotence and makes God weary. Neither does God create and then simply stand 
back from his creation, for creation requires God’s continual and gratuitous sustaining 
power.
34
 Similarly, we cannot conclude that God needs to create and is therefore 
somehow perfected by his act of creation, because God enjoys eternal bliss and 
fulfilment. In no sense does God need creation, even if God desires creation. So 
Augustine states that, 
 
we take it that God so rested from all his works which he had made 
that from now on he set up no new kind of nature any more, not so that 
he stopped holding together and directing the ones which he had 
already set in place. Thus both statements are true: that God rested on 
the seventh day (Genesis 2.2) and that he is working until now (John 
5.17).
35
 
 
Augustine points out that God’s act of creation is complete in the sense that all that is 
and will be needed for creation’s divinely ordained purposes is now latent within the 
created order, even if it is yet to be realised. The foundations or principles of creation 
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are in place through the rationes seminales or ‘causal reasons’ that hold, in their 
potential guise, the forms that will be actualised through creation’s motion that has an 
angelic source. Thus Genesis makes a key claim concerning the created order: it is 
complete, whole and therefore ‘one’ (a universe), this being ritually expressed in the 
Sabbath rest. Genesis therefore announces creation’s goodness in terms of its 
wholeness or completeness. It is sufficient and features no intrinsic lack. There is a 
sense in which all things are created simultaneously at the beginning – as we read in 
Genesis – and yet are also unfolded within the processes of time.36 So Augustine 
writes, 
 
But clearly, if we suppose that he now sets any creature in place in such a way 
that he did not insert the kind of thing it is into that first construction of his, 
we are openly contradicting what scripture says, that he finished and 
completed all his works on the sixth day. Yes, within the categories of the 
various kinds of thing which he set up at first, he manifestly makes many new 
things which he did not make then. But he cannot rightly be thought to set up 
any new kind, since he did then complete them all. And so by his hidden 
power he sets the whole of his creation in motion, and while it is whirled 
around with that movement, while angels carry out his orders, while the 
constellations circle round their courses…he unwinds the ages which he had 
as it were folded into the universe when it was first set up. These, however, 
would not go on being unwound along the tracks, if the one who set them 
going stopped moving them on by his provident regulation.
37
 
 
We will return to the importance of the Sabbath rest below. For now, it should be 
noted that the rationes seminales do not set creation on a narrowly deterministic path 
in such a way that nothing new or surprising emerges in creation. This is underlined 
by Augustine’s brief discussion of miracles. God does not prime the universe and then 
simply allow it to unfold along a narrow and restrictive path; the causal formulae can 
unfold in different ways that are consistent with the original potentialities they hold. 
We know this because there is a normal and predictable pattern of unfolding that we 
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witness in nature, whereas in the occurrence of miracles (Augustine mentions water 
into wine at Cana) we see a different pattern of unfolding.
38
 But this different pattern 
is not, insists Augustine, violently inconsistent with the original rationes seminales. 
So the original seeds within creation have an aptitude for a wide range of 
development according to the providential will of God. This also has the implication 
that, within the order of creation, miracles are not a fracture of that order, but a 
providential realisation of a usually hidden possibility with creation according to 
God’s gracious purposes.39 
 
A further important aspect of Augustine’s view of divine providence concerns its 
extent throughout the created order. It is not the case that God orders the higher levels 
of the cosmic hierarchy such as the heavens which behave with steady regularity 
whilst the lower levels exhibit chance and chaos; God providentially orders the 
whole.
40
 As Lewis Ayres points out, for Augustine it is the incarnation that re-
orientates our perception of the extent of divine providence and the ordering of the 
cosmos.
41
 The prologue to St. John’s gospel teaches that all things are created through 
the Word; it is the Word that is made flesh and therefore shares a material nature. 
Once material nature has been assumed by God to reveal the infinite and reconcile all 
things to himself, there is, in principle, no limit to the possibilities for material nature 
per se under the providential ordering of the Word. All men, in being flesh, are but 
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worms, yet humanity also shares a spiritual nature with angels.
42
 Humanity, in lying 
at the heart of the comic hierarchy, connects the lowest and the highest in the created 
order whilst they nevertheless remain in their proper places. So God, through the 
incarnation, becomes a worm (Psalm 21.7 and Job 25.6), as it were, and reaches to the 
heart of the cosmos to reveal that ‘There is no shape, no structure, no union of parts, 
no substance whatsoever which can have weight, number and measure unless it is 
through that Word.’43 As Ayres points out, we cannot see God’s providence lying 
only within that which we intuit as having ontological value; God orders and guides 
all things, from worms to angels, to their proper ends (Psalm 148.7).
44
 It is the Word 
through whom all things are made that lies at the heart of creation as the origin of its 
existence and order. The eternal reasons that lie complete in the Word become the 
rationes seminales that are implanted in creation to unfold in due time according to 
the providential will of God. 
 
The providential work of God, which unfolds creation according to the Word’s eternal 
reasons expressed as rationes seminales in creatures, is essentially a conferral of 
motion by God’s Wisdom that ‘reaches from end to end mightily, and arranges all 
things sweetly’.45 However, God is not subject to motion or change; this is what 
distinguishes a cosmos saturated in motion from God who is replete and requires no 
motion as the means of acquiring perfection.
46
 So how can God confer motion upon 
creation? Augustine elucidates this matter through an interpretation of texts from the 
Wisdom of Solomon where we read that Wisdom, as well as pervading creation and 
ordering all things sweetly, is ‘more mobile than any motion; because of her pureness 
she pervades and penetrates all things’.47 According to the Neoplatonic tradition that 
so influenced Augustine, God’s life is not the absence of motion in the way that a 
stationery body lacks motion. Rather, God is beyond motion and rest in such a way 
that God’s life has to be described as a ‘motionless motion’ or, to use the words of 
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Wisdom, ‘more mobile than any motion’.48 This is best imagined by means of a 
rotating globe. The circular motion of the sphere is most perfect because unlike, for 
example, a rotating cube, it moves entirely within its own boundaries and is therefore 
complete and one. Any one moment of the sphere’s rotation is identical to any other 
so it is not, strictly speaking, temporally divisible. A sphere’s rotation can be so rapid 
that it is impossible to judge whether it is at motion or at rest. Strangely, its motion is 
a kind of rest in the sense of being complete. Using this as a metaphor for the full 
actuality of the divine life, we can see that God’s life is complete, one, and entirely 
within its own eternal bounds in the same way that a sphere’s rotation is complete and 
one. Yet this ‘motionless motion’ is also ‘life itself’ in being supremely dynamic. It is 
a share in this supremely dynamic life – which is beyond the distinction between 
motion and rest – that divine Wisdom imparts to the created. Indeed, Augustine notes 
the scriptural connection between motion and life in Acts 17.28 where we read about 
Paul’s teaching in Athens, the centre of Greek learning, that ‘In him we live and move 
and have our being.’ We are ‘in’ God not in the sense of being one with his life, but in 
the sense that God confers upon creation a participation in the motionless motion of 
his life. Moreover, Wisdom’s ordering of all things sweetly implies that cosmic 
motion is not one of effort or force, but springs spontaneously and naturally from 
creatures’ rationes seminales in such a way that it is swift and nimble.49 So life and 
motion are intimately connected in Augustine’s cosmology, as they were for both 
Plato and Aristotle; should Wisdom’s motionless motion be withdrawn, creatures 
‘will perish forthwith’.50 It is the natural movements of things, conferred by God, 
which constitutes creaturely life and existence. 
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Augustine’s discussion of Wisdom’s conferral of cosmic motion marks a 
development of Plato’s Timaeus. For Plato, the motion of the cosmos is derived from 
the rotation of the World Soul that is first conferred on the heavenly spheres and 
thence pervades the living cosmos.
51
 It is easy to imagine that this motion is 
communicated through efficient causes (the World Soul acting on creatures) or 
participation in the Forms (and supremely the Form of the Good) through creatures’ 
inherent desire for their perfection. For Plato, this motion is what constitutes the 
cosmos as a living creature. The importance of the rationes seminales for Augustine 
adds more detail to Plato’s cosmology by identifying a kind of formal cause of 
teleological motion as intrinsic to creatures. The rationes seminales are created 
expressions of the eternal reasons that lie in the Word or God’s Wisdom. So those 
formal principles of motion are both intrinsic to creatures and also extrinsic in 
pointing to the eternal ordering reason of God. The source of cosmic motion and, 
therefore, life itself lies both within and beyond the creature. The creature truly moves 
itself, yet cannot move itself without the sustaining motion of God’s providential 
Wisdom that is the motionless motion of the divine life. Whereas for Plato cosmic 
motion is conferred more clearly from a transcendent source – the demiurge and the 
World Soul via the heavenly spheres and the souls of creatures – Augustine balances 
this with a more thorough description of an intrinsic principle of motion via the 
rationes seminales. 
 
Yet it is Augustine’s meditation on Paul’s teaching that creation lives, moves and has 
its being in God lies behind his clearest articulation of the nature of divine 
providential governance that indicates his radical distance from any modern notion of 
a designed creation or deistic creator.
52
 The way in which God moves creation 
indicates a blend of intrinsic and extrinsic formal and teleological order. Whilst God 
is immutable, spiritual creation is moved temporally. In addition, the material order, 
which is subject to place and therefore local motion, is moved both in time and space. 
God is the cause of ‘inward natures’ – the rationes seminales – which he administers 
‘outwardly’ by the movement of wills and bodies, the former in time and the latter 
both spatially and temporally. With the prologue of John’s gospel in the 
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background,
53
 time and space – the basis of motion and therefore life – come into 
being in God who, as the principle of time, space and motion, is simultaneously 
beyond these categories. So Augustine writes, 
 
…but we should realise that in the operation of divine providence these things 
do not happen in the operation by which he creates natures, but in the one by 
which he also administers externally the natures he has created internally.
54
 
 
So the forms of creatures are not imposed externally upon passive matter from which 
God subsequently withdraws after the fashion of a human designer. Neither is God a 
formal pantheistic principle that is purely intrinsic to the created order in such a way 
that naturalistic understandings of teleology would become thinkable. God’s creative 
providence is simultaneously external and internal because God is simple and beyond 
created categories. God can therefore be infinitely proximate to creatures – closer than 
our own breathing – whilst being irreducibly and ontologically other. 
 
The relation of simple and unmoved divinity to a universe saturated in motion is an 
important concern for Augustine. Whilst motion is central to his understanding of 
creation and providence, this physics requires a governing metaphysics in order to 
render it intelligible.
55
 To put the matter simply, motion requires a principle and goal 
that are beyond motion. These are the boundaries that ‘measure’ movement. 
Augustine explains this in a number of ways, one of which occurs in a seemingly 
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curious metaphorical aside in Book VIII of De Genesi ad litteram.
56
 There is a 
hierarchy of motion beginning with the creator Spirit that is beyond motion. Spiritual 
creatures are moved in time but not space; such motion would include, for example, 
willing and thinking. Finally, bodily creatures are subject to motion in time and space. 
Because humanity, being composed of soul and body, is spiritual and corporeal, it is 
subject to both psychic and local motion. The soul is the immediate source of motion 
in the creature, but how can an unextended substance that is not subject to local 
movement be the source of a body’s movement through both time and place? Of 
course, this is an ancient philosophical problem and Augustine explores it through a 
metaphor: the joints of the body. The motion of a finger through space is possible via 
that which is motionless, namely the joint around which the moving finger pivots. 
One might also think of the forearm moving via the still point of the elbow joint. The 
hierarchy of motion begins with the self-moving soul that is subject only to temporal 
movement. This motion is transmitted through the body’s still points – its joints – to 
those parts of the body (the limbs) subject to both local and temporal motion. 
Augustine’s point seems to be that motion has its principle in something that is not 
subject to motion, or is subject to a different kind of motion. He claims that the soul 
moves the body not as a mechanical efficient cause, but ‘with an intention’ (quadam 
intentione).  This strange and, at first glance, unconvincing metaphor is more effective 
in illustrating a metaphysical point characteristic of Neoplatonism that was to receive 
clearer expression in later thinkers: motion is rendered intelligible in being measured 
by that which does not move.
57
 In other words, it is in relation to a still point beyond 
motion (rather than another moving body) that motion is judged most intelligible 
because such motion can be described as motion to, away from or around that point.
58
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 It should be noted that in the context of classical physics as articulated by Newton 
and his successors, this is a very strange understanding of motion. For Newton, 
motion is a state of a body, not a process. It is rendered intelligible in relation to 
absolute space. Rest is simply the state of motion reduced to zero. It is nothing to do 
In turn, a purely temporal non-spatial motion is relative to, and measured by, a 
metaphysical ‘still point’ in the form of an eternal principle and goal. Ultimately, the 
motionless and eternal creator is the measure of all motion, for all motion, whether 
local or psychic, is towards or away from God as creation’s principle and end.  
 
Measure, Number and Weight 
This notion of a measure of motion leads us to one of the most distinctive features of 
Augustine’s writing on creation, namely his focus on Wisdom 11.20: ‘But you have 
arranged all things by measure and number and weight.’ 59  Measure, number and 
weight (mensura, numerus, pondus) are physical and metaphysical categories that 
delineate the bounds within which creation unfolds from the rationes seminales.
60
 In 
De Trinitate, Augustine describes the way in which creatures have been ‘seminally 
and primordially created in the very fabric, as it were, or texture of the elements; but 
they require the right occasion actually to emerge into being.’61 The world is ‘heavy 
with the causes of things’ and, when the right occasion arises, they are brought to 
birth by unfolding their measures, numbers and weights that are secretly assigned by 
God who is the primary cause of creatures. All three categories propose a limit for 
each creature and thereby grant that creature a particular mode of existence and an 
appropriate goal. By establishing a creature’s boundaries, it is distinguished from 
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other creatures and is prevented from any straining after limitlessness that would be 
an idolatrous mimicry of God who is beyond limit. So ‘measure’ is the key limit that 
indicates the boundaries of a creature’s existence and the appropriate (‘measured’ or 
‘balanced’) mode of its existence. It establishes the creature within intelligible bounds 
as a ‘this’ rather than a ‘that’. ‘Number’ indicates the harmonious proportions of a 
creature’s being in such a way that it fits as a part within the whole. ‘Weight’ 
indicates the creature’s innate tendency towards its telos, much as the heavy object is 
carried to its proper place through its form. Although measure, number and weight, as 
aspects of God’s providential ordering of creation, are the means by which creation 
participates in God, they are not aspects of divine being. Augustine is clear that God 
is ‘measure without measure’, ‘number without number’ and ‘weight without 
weight’.62 In other words, whilst God is the source of measure, number and weight, he 
is not these things in himself for God is not measured, numbered or weighed. God 
establishes a form of existence for creatures via their measure, number and weight, 
but God is not thereby a form of existence; he is existence itself. So Augustine writes, 
 
…insofar as measure sets a limit to everything, and number gives everything 
its specific form, and weight draws everything to rest and stability, he [God] is 
the original, true and unique measure which defines for all things their bounds, 
the number which forms all things, the weight which guides all things.
63
 
 
As Dunham and others have shown, Augustine associates measure, number and 
weight with the Trinity.
64
 The Father, who is the source and principle of all things, is 
the measure of creatures by the establishment of their beginning and end. The Son, 
through whom and for whom all things were made, establishes creaturely number and 
proportion because in the eternal Word we find the forms of creatures and the 
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harmonious and beautiful structure of the universe.
65
 Finally, the Holy Spirit is the 
‘weight’ of creatures that providentially guides them in motion towards a telos in 
stability, resting as that which they were made to be. Whilst the material creature is 
drawn to its proper place in the cosmos by its physical weight, the ‘weight’ of the 
spiritual creature’s will and love draws it to repose in a certain form of spiritual 
existence, for example a state of wisdom.
66
 
 
By the mediating categories of measure, number and weight, Augustine establishes 
the centrality of (to use the parlance of later scholastic Aristotelians) formal and final 
causation. Creatures are measured through their form. This limits them and allows the 
actualisation of a particular potency to be this or that creature. Weight is a creature’s 
orientation to its proper end in the fulfilment of its form. So formal and final 
causation are necessarily connected. Form and finality are also the basis of creaturely 
motion for they establish the unfolding of a formal nature in a particular direction. 
Indeed, Augustine is clear that, without form, there can be no motion because motion 
is passage from form to form as creatures seek the actualisation of their proper form.
67
 
Without such motion arising from formal natures, there would be no time and the 
universe would be without history: ‘for where there is no form and no order, nothing 
comes and nothing passes away, and as a consequence there are no days nor any 
changes to mark the duration of time.’68 Moreover, Augustine links weight and final 
causation when he writes of the link between amor and pondus: ‘My love is my 
weight: wherever I go, my love is what brings me there.’69 The ‘weight’ of creatures 
is their desire for the fulfilment of their formal natures; that ‘weight’ carries them to 
particular ends. Through form, they constantly seek stability, order and rest within the 
complex negotiations of creaturely motions within the cosmic order. In the human 
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person rightly orientated, this movement is love as we desire rest in God. One can 
speak analogously of the ‘love’ and ‘desire’ of all creatures that carries them to their 
proper end. This includes the weight of objects that carries them to their proper place. 
Teleological order belongs to inanimate and animate alike as all seek stability and 
order through measure, number and weight. 
 
Against this background and the importance of measured motion, what is the 
significance of creaturely and divine rest? We saw above that God rests on the 
seventh day because the work of creation is complete and whole in the sense that 
creation possesses all that it requires to fulfil God’s purposes, even if only latently or 
potentially. Yet God continues to work in the providential guidance of creation to its 
proper end and stability through the mediation of measure, number and weight. 
Augustine’s interpretation of divine rest, which comes immediately after his 
consideration of measure, number and weight in the literal commentary on Genesis, 
finally reveals the teleological and providential order of creation: creatures are to seek 
their rest or fulfilment in God and the Sabbath, which belongs to all creation, is a 
ritual anticipation of the consummation of all things in God.  
 
So all that remains for us to understand, perhaps, is that he granted rest in 
himself to the rational creation in which he also created the man, after 
perfecting him through the gift of the Holy Spirit…so that we should be borne 
along by the impetus of desire to the place where we shall rest, the place, that 
is, where we shall look for nothing further, when we reach it. After all, just as 
God is rightly said to do whatever we do by his working in us, so God is 
rightly said to rest, when we rest thanks to his munificence.
70
 
 
In seeking to reconcile divine immutability with temporal categories such as rest or 
coming to know, Augustine claims that, when scripture speaks of these things, in a 
very strict sense the change must be ascribed to creatures rather than God. For 
example, when we read in Genesis 22 that God came to know Abraham’s fear of him, 
God does not realise some knowledge in himself through the process of time. Rather, 
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this ‘coming to know’ refers to God bringing Abraham to know the fear of the Lord.71 
When scripture tells us that God rests, in a strict sense this means that God brings his 
creatures to rest in his goodness, for in that goodness they find their fulfilment. This 
rest is not, however, a stasis or a quantity of motion reduced to zero. It is completion 
in the sense that the creature has nothing further to actualise as that creature. The 
rationes seminales have been brought to fruition through God’s providential care in 
measure, number and weight. Creatures now share in the divine stability that is 
intimated in every ritual Sabbath (Genesis 2.1-3; Deuteronomy 5.14; Leviticus 25.4). 
The Sabbath punctuates creation’s processes and reminds us that creation’s good, 
unlike God’s eternal goodness, is the outcome of motion. It is a teleological process 
whose end is disclosed obliquely in the Sabbath, particularly in Christ’s new 
resurrection Sabbath. That telos is worship. Creation’s weight carries it to the worship 
of God where it finds its ultimate purpose and stability. God’s rest is creation’s rest 
when we shall look for nothing further. Only in the divine goodness, in the vision of 
God, do we look no further because our looking is complete. 
 
Conclusion 
The problematic aspects of modern understandings of creation tend to rest on a series 
of dualistic distinctions that make it difficult to articulate the wholeness of creation 
and its proper relation to God. One such distinction concerns intrinsic and extrinsic 
providential order. On the one hand, Augustine is accused of denigrating the value of 
the material and holding a Platonic view of the extrinsic nature of teleological order 
that ascribes no intrinsic value to the material order of creation. In this article, we 
have seen that this is an erroneous reading of the theology of creation that is scattered 
through Augustine’s treatises. God administers externally, through measure, number 
and weight, the natures he has created internally in the rationes seminales. He draws 
material and spiritual creation into his life by the conferral of motion that leads to a 
share in the divine stability or ‘motionless motion’ of God’s eternal rest. In the 
beginning God creates the heavens and the earth as two extremes: on the one hand, 
primal matter receiving form, and on the other the pure forms of the angelic natures 
that enjoy the vision of God. The former is radically potential, the latter replete and 
actual. His providential governance extends between these extremes. The incarnation 
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lies at the heart of creation between these extremes and reveals the full extent of 
God’s providential governance of creation as the Word takes a material nature to 
itself. It is hard to imagine a theology of creation further removed from the deism of 
early modern thought. Yet Augustine’s view also indicates that our understanding of 
providential teleological order must resist the dualism of intrinsic and extrinsic 
because this can give rise to further dualisms that become fatal for an adequate 
doctrine of creation because the concepts are mutually exclusive.
72
 God is both 
intrinsic and extrinsic, transcendent and immanent, but this is only intelligible through 
a clear distinction between creator and creation in which the relation of creatures to 
God is wholly asymmetrical. God’s eternal simplicity draws creatures to share in 
divine rest through the measure of their form, the number of their beauty, and the 
weight of their love. 
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